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I. INTRODUCTION
Of the 5.2 million American Indians and Alaska Natives,2 approximately 60% live on or
near reservation land.3 According to the Federal Reserve, there is a “strong and unmet demand for
homeownership” among this population. 4 In 2016, just 52.9% of all Natives were homeowners,
while 75.0% report a strong desire to own their home.5 Additionally, concerns about chronic
housing shortages, quality of available housing, and overcrowded living conditions on tribal lands
suggest additional demand for new investments in private homes in Indian Country.6 According
to the National Congress of American Indians:
“[t]he ability of a tribal nation to fully exercise its sovereignty in order to achieve
social, cultural, and economic prosperity depends to a large degree on the ability
of the individuals and families who make up that nation to achieve self-sufficiency.
Homeownership represents a vital pathway in that pursuit, yet across Indian
Country it is underutilized, poorly resourced, and not fully understood.”7
Furthermore, federal law requires mortgage lenders to lend without regard to a person’s
race, national origin, or a variety of other protected characteristics.8 Lenders are held to this
standard under Title VII, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and the Fair Housing Act
(FHA). As will be discussed below, these laws were designed to enable access to credit regardless
of a person’s race, whether through disparate treatment or disparate impact. However, tribal
governments have largely failed to establish standing in order to bring these cases in federal court,
and the federal agencies responsible for enforcing these laws have done little to encourage lenders
to follow them.
Alongside the ECOA and FHA are a variety of mortgage regulations, many created in the
wake of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, designed to reduce risk in the mortgage market. One of the
causes of the crisis was rampant lending by banks to consumers who could not afford to repay
their loans.9 While this concept may seem counterintuitive (why would a bank intentionally make

A note on terminology: the terms ‘American Indian’ and ‘Native American’ are used interchangeably. See What is
the correct terminology: American Indian, Indian, Native American, or Native?, NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE
AMERICAN INDIAN, https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/faq/did-you-know [https://perma.cc/8RXT-ER6P] (last
visited Nov. 20, 2020).
3
Ed. Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Leaders Handbook on Homeownership, CENTER FOR INDIAN COUNTRY
DEVELOPMENT, (2018) at 3, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/community/indiancountry/resourceseducation/cicd-tribal-leaders-handbook-on-homeownership.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/73R9-GZNL].
4
Id. At 4-5.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 10.
8
See 12 C.F.R. Part 1002 - Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Regulation B), available at
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/regulations/1002/ [https://perma.cc/ZN4EWPTE].
9
Erin Coghlan, Lisa McCorkell, and Sara Hinkley, What Really Caused the Great Recession?, UNIV, OF CAL.
BERKELEY INST. FOR RES. ON LAB. AND EMPLOYMENT (Sept. 19, 2018), https://irle.berkeley.edu/what-really-causedthe-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/A99U-TNFG].
2
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a loan that it knows will not be repaid?), the secondary market for mortgages allowed banks to
package mortgages into so-called “mortgage backed securities,” which were sold to investors.10
The originating banks were able to realize their profits, while passing on the risks (and ultimately
the losses) to investors, who previously relied on mortgages as a safe investment.11
In order to prevent a future crisis, Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau (CFPB) (“the Bureau”), as a part of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act.12 The CFPB began enacting mortgage rules shortly thereafter that
required numerous safeguards like assessing a borrower’s “ability to repay” the loan and ensuring
that mortgages were secured by an appropriate lien on the property.13 These, and other federal
regulations that came before them, are critical to ensuring the stability of the housing market and
the broader economy – their importance cannot be overstated. However, one secondary effect is
the difficulty these rules created for lending on tribal lands.
While a lien could theoretically be placed on a home on tribal land, it is the enforcement
of that lien that is problematic.
[T]he laws of tribal sovereignty as it has developed in the federal courts and by
federal statutes, executive orders and treaties over the last two centuries . . . tribes
cannot be sued absent their express consent or a waiver of their immunity . . . The
confusion is compounded by the variety of ways in which land in Indian Country
may be owned or held, and the nature of the particular tribal, federal or state
interests that may be involved. In brief, it is often difficult for a nontribal entity to
know with whom it is dealing, with whom it is best to deal, and with what it is
dealing.14
To begin to understand the issues surrounding fair lending to consumers residing on tribal
lands, it is important to understand several different, and extremely niche, areas of law, including
1) federal fair lending laws; 2) mortgage regulation and the secondary market; and 3) constitutional
jurisprudence as it relates to tribal sovereignty. These three areas of law have great potential to
contradict each other and finding a way to conform with all three requires a broad knowledge base.
This presents another obstacle to lenders who are interested in serving tribal customers; only the
most sophisticated lenders will be able to understand how to do so while complying with such a
complex web of rules.
Much of the tribal land in the U.S. cannot be repossessed, and therefore prevents lenders
from adequately securing a mortgage loan with a lien – if a consumer defaults the lender may not
have any recourse. While lenders face legitimate obstacles to lending on tribal land, choosing to
10

Id.
Id.
12
Pub.L. 111–203, July 21, 2010.
13
What is a Qualified Mortgage?, CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAu (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-qualified-mortgage-en-1789/ [https://perma.cc/B4RZ-GBY7].
14
Sue Woodrow, Tribal sovereign immunity: An obstacle for non-Indians doing business in Indian Country?,
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS (July 1, 1998) https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/1998/tribalsovereign-immunity-an-obstacle-for-nonindians-doing-business-in-indian-country [https://perma.cc/7X44-DLK5].
11
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avoid lending on tribal lands altogether could result in a disparate impact (discussed in greater
detail below) for Native Americans / American Indians.
This paper seeks to outline the obstacles for lenders, borrowers, regulators, and tribal
governments; to present the solutions implemented through public-private partnerships and
independently by tribal governments to work around these obstacles; and to weigh the benefits and
drawbacks of such approaches for each group of stakeholders.
II. MORTGAGE LENDING
A. The Mortgage Market
The social and economic benefits of homeownership are broadly valued in the United
States. Nationally, more than 65% of Americans own their homes.15 Homeowners’ median net
worth in the U.S. is eighty times that of renters’ median net worth. 16 Home equity is the largest
portion of most Americans’ net worth, representing more than one third of total wealth.17 However,
many of these benefits are realized at different levels in different demographic groups. For
example, approximately three-quarters of non-Hispanic White families own their homes (74% at
the end of 2019), compared to 44% of African Americans, 48% of Hispanics, and 58% of other
racial and ethnic groups.18 The U.S. Census Bureau estimated homeownership rates for Native
Americans / American Indians at approximately 53% as of 2016 – more than 20% less than the
rate for non-Hispanic White families. 19 20
Given the economic advantages of home ownership, it is easy to understand how lower
rates of home ownership for an entire racial group can have lasting intergenerational impacts,
including preventing the accumulation of wealth and access to education. It is therefore important
to ask what is causing the difference in home ownership rates. Do entire racial groups hold a
preference to rent rather than own? Are there purely economic barriers to homeownership? If these
barriers are indeed purely economic, what could be causing them? Are certain groups intrinsically
less capable of accumulating the wealth necessary to purchase a home or could broader and
systemic discrimination be a factor?

15

Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 30,
2020), available at https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA26-FM55].
16
Jonathan Eggleston and Donald Hays, Many U.S. Households Do Not Have Biggest Contributors to Wealth:
Home Equity and Retirement Accounts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 27, 2019),
https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2019/08/gaps-in-wealth-americans-by-household-type.html
[https://perma.cc/CUY2-H3CL].
17
Jonathan Eggleston and Robert Munk, Net Worth of Households: 2015, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, May 2019,
available at https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/demo/P70BR-164.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CN2L-QCTV].
18
Quarterly Residential Vacancies and Homeownership, Fourth Quarter 2019, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Jan. 30,
2020, available at https://www.census.gov/housing/hvs/files/currenthvspress.pdf [https://perma.cc/HS8G-6FB3].
19
Supra note 3 at 4-5.
20
Securing Homeownership for Native Americans, PROSPERITY NOW (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://prosperitynow.org/blog/securing-homeownership-native-americans [https://perma.cc/R4A3-D5WV].
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B. The Role of the Secondary Market
Very few people can afford to buy a home outright and most will rely on mortgage
financing to do so (86% of homebuyers financed their home purchases in 2019).21 Most home
financing is done through mortgages, in which a bank or other lender places a lien on the property,
using the land and structure as collateral until the loan has been paid in full. This lien allows the
bank to take possession of a property if the homeowner fails to pay the loan.22
In the U.S. the majority of loans are sold to a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) or
other investors within a year of being originated.23 A GSE is a type of financial services
corporation created by Congress and designed to ensure a constant flow of credit to targeted sectors
of the economy. 24 This structure helps markets operate more efficiently by reducing the risk to
investors and other suppliers of capital.25 Well known GSEs include the Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(“Freddie Mac”).26
To streamline this process and ensure consistent liquidity in the mortgage market, federal
regulators have developed guidelines for “conforming” mortgage loans and “qualified mortgages”
(QM).27 These two concepts share some overlapping characteristics but the intricacies of how they
work together is beyond the comprehension of all but a handful of experts. To make a loan that
can easily be sold on the secondary market, lenders will generally try to comply with both
requirements.
1. Conforming Loans
A conforming loan is one that can be bought by the GSEs and other investors with minimal
scrutiny of underwriting standards and supporting documentation.28 29 Conforming loans generally
have to comply with certain loan limits, loan terms, fee limits, and other underwriting criteria. 30

2019 Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, Nov. 7, 2019, available at
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/documents/2019-profile-of-home-buyers-and-sellers-highlights-11-072019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FW2F-UJYU].
22
See, e.g., Dock David Treece, Liens: What They Are And How They Work, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/mortgages/liens-what-they-are-and-how-they-work/ [https://perma.cc/64WQCA3K].
23
N. Eric Weiss and Katie Jones, An Overview of the Housing Finance System in the United States,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, (Jan. 18, 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42995.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R42B-ZGJB].
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Lemke, Lins and Picard, Mortgage-Backed Securities, Chapters 1 and 2 (Thomson West, 2013 ed.).
27
N. Eric Weiss and Katie Jones, An Overview of the Housing Finance System in the United States,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (Jan. 18, 2017), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42995.pdf.
28
Id.
29
Alena Savchenko, Conforming vs. Non-conforming Loans: Which Is Best for You? PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES
LLC (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.pennymacusa.com/blog/conforming-vs-non-conforming-loans
[https://perma.cc/V326-GN5A].
30
Id.
21
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One major advantage of a conforming loan for the consumer is a lower interest rate. 31 While it is
possible for a financial institution to make a non-conforming loan, the interest rate is likely to be
higher (and therefore more expensive for the consumer) and it will be harder for the lender to sell
the loan on the secondary market.32 This means that if a lender decides to make one of these loans,
they need to be prepared to “hold the loan in portfolio” and therefore remain liable for the risk of
the consumer defaulting on the loan.33
2. Qualified Mortgages under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z)
A qualified mortgage is defined by the Ability to Repay/Qualified Mortgage (ATR/QM)
rule, part of Regulation Z34 (also called the Truth in Lending Act (TILA)).35 36 The purpose of the
QM rule is to “. . . promote the informed use of consumer credit by requiring disclosures about its
terms and cost . . . [and] prohibit[] certain acts or practices in connection with credit secured by a
dwelling . . .”37 Specifically, the CFPB’s QM regulation requires lenders to verify a borrowers'
ability to repay, and includes safe harbor protection for loans with certain features, including a
maximum 43% debt-to-income (DTI) limit.38 The rule also included a provision that allowed all
mortgages backed by Fannie and Freddie to get QM status, even with a higher DTI ratio.39 40 This
concept has been referred to as the “QM patch” (which allows mortgages backed by the GSEs to
get QM status) and although it was set to expire in January 2021,41 the patch has been extended.42
One of the requirements for these types of loans is a lien on real property that would allow
the lender (or servicer) to take possession of the property in event of foreclosure on the loan.43 44

31

Id.
Id.
33
Kimberly Rotter, Is a Portfolio Mortgage Right for You?, U.S. NEWS, July 16, 2018, https://loans.usnews.com/isa-portfolio-mortgage-right-for-you.
34
12 C.F.R. § 1026.
35
Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), CFPB, Jan.
30, 2013, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/final-rules/ability-repay-and-qualifiedmortgage-standards-under-truth-lending-act-regulation-z/ [https://perma.cc/5835-R637].
36
Ability to repay and qualified mortgages (ATR/QM), CFPB, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/guidance/mortgage-resources/ability-repay-qualified-mortgage-rule/ [https://perma.cc/CT8N-CSXE].
37
12 C.F.R. § 1026.1(b) (2017).
38
Hannah Lang, CFPB to extend 'qualified mortgage' exemption for GSEs, report says, AMERICAN BANKER, Jan.
21, 2020, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-to-extend-qualified-mortgage-exemption-for-gses-reportsays [https://perma.cc/TRW2-Z45W].
39
Id.
40
Basic guide for lenders - What is a Qualified Mortgage? CFPB, Oct. 2013, available at
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310_cfpb_qm-guide-for-lenders.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T84-6XLH].
41
Supra note 37.
42
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule Extending the GSE Patch, CFPB (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-issues-final-ruleextending-the-gse-patch/ [https://perma.cc/G6B6-BG9L].
43
See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.35(a)(1)(i), Comments 38(t)(5)(ix)-1, 34(a)(3)-2 (2017).
44
Karan Kaul & Laurie Goodman, What, If Anything, Should Replace the QM GSE Patch?, URBAN INSTITUTE ,
(Aug. 2018), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/98949/qualified_mortgage_rule.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KQ2E-AAES].
32
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Ensuring that a mortgage loan is secured by a valid lien on real property provides a legal “safe
harbor” for these lenders in the event of foreclosure.45
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS LENDING ON TRIBAL LANDS
A. Land Ownership of Tribal Lands
The roots of the challenges to ownership of tribal lands in the U.S. are deep. The issue
entered American jurisprudence in 1823 with the United States Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh.46 In this case, two private landowners purchased land, one from
the Piankeshaw Native American tribes and one from the U.S. federal government. 47 While the
landowners represented to the court that the parcels overlapped, in reality there was no overlap,
and the parties were merely seeking an opinion from the court.48
After reviewing the transfer of land title from the tribes to the British Crown and
subsequent independence of the American colonies from the British Crown, the Supreme Court
settled the matter by holding that:
1) private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans (“A title to
lands, under grants to private individuals, made by Indian tribes or nations . . .
cannot be recognised in the Courts of the United States.”);49 and
2) that tribal lands could only be purchased through the U.S. federal government
(“Nature of the Indian title, as subordinate to the absolute ultimate title of the
government.”).50
Justice Marshall’s opinion laid the foundations of the doctrine of aboriginal title51 in United
States law, holding that such title is inalienable, except in cases of “just war” and subject to the

45

Id.
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 1823 WL 2465, 21 U.S. 543, (U.S.,1823).
47
Id. at 543.
48
Eric Kades, Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1065, at 1092-1093 (2000), available at
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review/vol148/iss4/2 [https://perma.cc/9KDV-9EJ3]. "Mapping the
United Companies" claims alongside M'Intosh's purchases, as enumerated in the district court records, shows that
the litigants' land claims did not overlap. Hence, there was no real 'case or controversy,' and M'Intosh, like another
leading early Supreme Court land case, Fletcher v. Peck, appears to have been a sham. . . . M'Intosh did not contest a
single fact alleged in the complaint, jurisdictional or otherwise. Perhaps he participated in framing the complaint,
which became the stipulated facts of the case. Neither the district court nor the Supreme Court questioned any of
these facts. Everyone involved, it seems, wanted a decision on the legal question of the validity of private purchases
from the Native Americans."
49
Supra note 46 at 562.
50
Id.
51
“Aboriginal title/native title is a term referring to the proprietary, customary law interests in land of indigenous
communities or ‘first nations’, employed mainly in common law jurisdictions such as Canada, the US, Australia,
and New Zealand.” See Hanri Mostert, Aboriginal Title, OXFORD PUBLIC INT’L LAW, available at
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1886
[https://perma.cc/2SML-EHTD] (last accessed Feb. 29, 2020).
46

48

right of Indians to occupy the land (“subject only to the Indian right of occupancy”).52 This
principle remains good law in most common law jurisdictions today.53
According to the U.S. Department of Interior, “Native American land ownership involves
a complex patchwork of titles, restrictions, obligations, statutes, and regulations.”54 Legally, title
to Native American lands can be held in a variety of ways, including 1) trust land / allotments, “in
which the federal government holds legal title, but the beneficial interest remains with the
individual or tribe;” and 2) “Fee land purchased by tribes, in which the tribe acquires legal title
under specific statutory authority.”55 Most Native American land (about 80%), more than 56
million acres, is held in trust by the U.S. government for the many tribes that live on that land.56 57
A further 18-19% of tribal land is held in trust for individual Native Americans, while the
remaining lands are held in fee simple, similar to lands off the reservation. 58
B. Tribal Sovereignty and the Federal Government
The foundations of this land ownership arrangement date back to the U.S. Constitution
itself, specifically the Commerce Clause, which states that the United States Congress shall have
power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."59 In a series of Supreme Court decisions, known as the Marshall Trilogy, which
included Johnson v. M’Intosh (1823),60 described above, as well as Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
(1831),61 and Worcester v. Georgia (1832),62 former Supreme Court Justice John Marshall
established several important principles of Native American law:63
1) Established “federal primacy” over Indian lands, meaning that the federal
government, but not state governments or private parties, could exert control over
those lands;
2) Excluded state law from Indian country; and
52

Supra note 48.
Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, WILLIAM & MARY L. SCH.
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY, FACULTY PUBL’N, 67-116 (2001), available at
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/50 [https://perma.cc/BZ9R-8E6Q].
54
Native American Ownership and Governance of Natural Resources, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE DATA, https://revenuedata.doi.gov/how-it-works/native-american-ownershipgovernance/ [https://perma.cc/Z74F-QTWT] (last visited Feb. 29, 2020).
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Yair Listokin, Confronting the Barriers to Native American Homeownership on Tribal Lands: The Case of the
Navajo Partnership for Housing, 33 URB. LAW. 433, 439–40 (2001), available at https://www-jstororg.proxy.seattleu.edu/stable/27895300.
58
Id.
59
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3.
60
21 U.S. 543 (1823).
61
30 U.S. 1 (1831).
62
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
63
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, A.B.A., HUMAN RIGHTS MAGAZINE,
Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct. 1, 2014)
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/2014_vol_40/vol--40--no--1-tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/JTJ6-6GE8].
53
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3) Recognized the ability of tribes to govern themselves.64
Marshall described the relationship between the federal government and the tribes, in Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, as follows:
The Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and heretofore an
unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished
by a voluntary cession to our government. It may well be doubted whether those
tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can
with strict accuracy be denominated foreign nations. They may more correctly
perhaps be denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to
which we assert a title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of
possession when their right of possession ceases—meanwhile they are in a state of
pupilage. Their relations to the United States resemble that of a ward to his
guardian. They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and
its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the President as their
great father.65
In 1886, Justice Miller expanded upon this view in U.S. v. Kagama, holding that:
The mention of Indians in the constitution which has received most attention is that
found in the clause which gives congress ‘power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.’ . . . But this
power of congress to organize territorial governments, and make laws for their
inhabitants, arises, not so much from the clause in the constitution in regard to
disposing of and making rules and regulations concerning the territory and other
property of the United States, as from the ownership of the country in which the
territories are, and the right of exclusive sovereignty which must exist in the
national government, and can be found nowhere else.66
As a general matter, beginning in 1886, the Supreme Court did in fact hold that the federal
government had plenary power over the tribes and their members, expanding upon the ward /
guardian relationship described in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia .67

64

Id.
Cherokee Nation v. State of Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 2, 1831 WL 3974, at *10 (U.S.,1831)
66
U.S. v. Kagama, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1111–12, 118 U.S. 375, 378–80 (U.S. 1886).
67
See Irene K. Harvey, Constitutional Law: Congressional Plenary Power Over Indian Affairs--A Doctrine Rooted
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1. General Allotment Act of 1887 (The Dawes Act)
In an effort to break up native reservations, Congress established allotment as a national
policy. While this practice started in the 1700s, it did not become widespread until the passage
of the General Allotment Act of 1887, also known as the Dawes Act.69 Under the Dawes Act, the
federal government allotted a specified amount of land (usually 80 or 160 acres) to each tribal
member.70 These allotments were intended to be held in trust for the benefit of their native residents
for a specified period of time, generally twenty-five years, after which time the government would
remove the trust status and issue the allottee fee simple title to the land.71
Whether contemplated or not, after the termination of the trust the land became subject to
state and local taxation.72 The costs of this taxation forced many Native Americans off of their
land after the trusts were terminated;73 in 1887, the year the Dawes Act was passed, tribal members
held 138 million acres of land, while in 1934, they owned only 48 million acres.74 The federal
government ended the allotment policy in 1934 and extended the trust period indefinitely.75 Today,
allotments are still held in trust by the federal government for the beneficial Native American
owner. However, the allotment policy substantially reduced the total acreage owned by native
peoples and left behind a checkerboard of land ownership on many reservations. 76
Furthermore, as the original recipients of allotments died, their land was divided among
their descendants, with each receiving only a fractional share of the whole (“fractionation”).77
Ownership of allotted lands has continued to divide over multiple generations and today,
individual parcels can have more than 100 co-owners.78 This fractionation continues to limit
economic development on reservation land and can divide lease income among co-owners so that
individuals receive just a few cents per share, as well as complicating title to the land in the case
of securing the property as collateral for a loan.79
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2. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
The allotment era ended in 1934 because of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 80 The
IRA allowed the Secretary of the Interior to return unallotted / surplus lands to tribal ownership
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and incentivized tribes to adopt governance structures and constitutions akin to those found in state
and local governments across the U.S.81 Most federally-recognized tribes were organized under
the IRA and while the act’s specific impacts varied from tribe to tribe, it marked a national shift
toward federal promotion of tribal self-government.
3. Modern Caselaw
Supreme Court jurisprudence into the 1980s and beyond acknowledged increased tribal
sovereignty in many areas, ranging from taxation to criminal prosecution.82 The more modern
caselaw on the topic is well illustrated by Justice Thomas’s 2013 analysis of the meaning of the
commerce clause as it relates to Indian tribes in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl:
The Indian Commerce Clause contains an additional textual limitation relevant to
this case: Congress is given the power to regulate Commerce “with the Indian
tribes.” The Clause does not give Congress the power to regulate commerce with
all Indian persons any more than the Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce with all foreign nationals traveling within the United
States. A straightforward reading of the text, thus, confirms that Congress may only
regulate commercial interactions— “commerce”—taking place with established
Indian communities— “tribes.” That power is far from “plenary.”83
However, the most recent caselaw has marked a movement away from tribal sovereignty:
“The Court routinely, though not always, has reversed presumptions favoring tribal interests and
federal interests favoring Indian tribes. From the beginning of the Rehnquist Court to the current
term of the Roberts Court, tribal interests have prevailed on less than one-quarter of the cases.”84
In Cass County v. Leech Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, for example, the Court held that states
could tax on-reservation land owned by the tribe, in direct opposition to the Marshall doctrine of
more than 150 years prior.85 The inconsistency in this area of law could be one explanation why
businesses are wary of operating on tribal lands. In addition to the niche expertise required, this
area of law continues to change, increasing the risk of doing business on tribal lands.
The history of tribal land ownership provides a critical backdrop for understanding the
complexities of mortgage lending on tribal lands, specifically, for understanding two major legal
obstacles to mortgage lending on tribal lands.86 First, the land is rarely “owned” (being held in fee
simple) by the person taking out the mortgage loan or living in the house because most tribal lands
are held in trust by the federal government.87 Second, tribal sovereignty means that property on
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these lands is governed by sovereign tribes.88 Adding these considerations on top of an already
complex mortgage transaction causes lenders to be uncertain about their ability to recover on
outstanding or unpaid mortgage balances that are secured by liens on tribal land and caused lenders
to be hesitant about making such loans.89
IV. FEDERAL REGULATION OF THE MORTGAGE MARKET
The mortgage market in the United States is regulated primarily at the federal level (with
some patchwork regulation by the states for certain types of lenders).90 Even before the financial
crisis, there were a large number of federal mortgage regulations in place.91 However, after the
financial crisis, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was created by the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd Frank Act”) to prevent a future crisis
through “the strongest consumer protections in history.”92 Within a few years of its creation, the
Bureau had published several mortgage lending rules that would change the way the mortgage
industry operated, including stronger underwriting requirements that reduced the risks for both
lenders and borrowers.93 (The importance of these rules for stabilizing the mortgage market cannot
be overstated and nothing in this article is intended to minimize the critical nature of these rules
for preventing a future financial crisis. However, there can be unintended consequences and there
remains room to improve upon these rules by minimizing their impact on economically vulnerable
populations.)
A. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
As discussed in the introduction, all lenders (not only mortgage lenders) are required by
federal law to lend without regard to a person’s race, national origin, or a variety of other protected
characteristics.94 The ECOA has an interesting history that started in an effort to promote gender
equality, and was later expanded to cover a broader list of protected groups:
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act was implemented in 1976 to prevent the
discriminatory practice of forcing married women to obtain their spouse's guarantee
88
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on any loan that they wished to receive. Prior to the enactment of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, it was a common practice for creditors to refuse to consider
married women for individual credit. Indeed, despite the woman's credit history or
income, she was not extended credit without her husband's signature on the note.
As a result, married women were unable to purchase the most essential items. The
purchase of an automobile, a refrigerator, or even something as simple as a dress
was often impossible without the consent and cooperation of her husband. In order
to eradicate this type of discrimination, Congress enacted 12 C.F.R. § 202
(hereinafter "Regulation B").95
Today, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) makes it “illegal for a creditor to
discriminate in any aspect of credit transaction based on certain characteristics.”96 In addition, the
Fair Housing Act (FHA) makes any discrimination in home financing illegal.97 Under the ECOA
and the FHA, it is illegal to: 1) refuse a consumer credit if they qualify for it; 2) discourage a
consumer from applying for credit; 3) offer a consumer credit on terms that are less favorable, like
a higher interest rate, than terms offered to someone with similar qualifications; or 4) close a
consumer’s account – if such actions are on the basis of: 1) race or color; 2) religion; 3) national
origin; 4) sex (including gender)98; 5) marital status; 6) age (as long as the consumer is old enough
to enter into a contract); 7) receipt of income from any public assistance program; or 8) exercising
in good faith your rights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act.99
Lenders are held to this standard under both Title VII and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and can be subject to suit under disparate treatment and disparate impact standards. 100 Under
a disparate treatment standard, lenders may not treat consumers differently based on a protected
characteristic.101 Under a disparate impact standard, lenders violate the law if their actions result
in an adverse impact on a particular protected class group, even if their treatment of all consumers
is the same.102 To the extent that creditors can prove that a practice is vital to the financial
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soundness of its operations, despite producing an adverse impact to protected class consumers (as
in the case of using credit scores), they may still be found to comply with the ECOA.103
ECOA claims can be brought in three different manners: 1) by private parties; 2) through
legal actions filed by the federal government; and 3) through administrative actions by federal
agencies.104 Failure to comply with Regulation B can subject a financial institution to civil liability
for actual and punitive damages in individual or class actions.105 Liability for punitive damages
can be as much as $10,000 in individual actions and the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the creditor's
net worth in class actions.106
Federal enforcement of the ECOA is accomplished through a patchwork of jurisdictional
designations among the Department of Justice (DOJ), Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) (part of the Department of the Treasury), Federal
Reserve Board (FRB), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National Credit Union
Administration (NCUA), and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).107 Although all of these
federal agencies have jurisdiction to bring ECOA claims, enforcement is primarily conducted
through the CFPB. The CFPB has the broadest jurisdiction, including over “[b]anks, savings
associations, and credit unions with total assets of over $10 billion and their affiliates [and]
mortgage brokers, mortgage originators, mortgage servicers, lenders offering private educational
loans, and payday lenders regardless of size.”108 The CFPB must also refer “pattern or practice
violations” (repeated or systematic violations) to the DOJ.109
While, in theory, a tribal government could bring a case under the ECOA, these suits have
yet to be successful. For example, in Navajo Nation v. Wells Fargo, the Federal Court for the
District of New Mexico dismissed the tribe’s causes of action under the ECOA on the ground that
they related to violations of individual tribal members’ rights and “Plaintiff does not have standing
in its parens patriae capacity to bring claims that involve injuries to purely private interests.”110
111
The Navajo Nation appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that “tribe did
not allege injury to quasi-sovereign interest that was sufficiently concrete to create actual
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controversy, and thus, tribe lacked standing in its parens patriae capacity to maintain claims for
violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) . . .”112
The doctrine of parens patriae “refers to the ‘right of a State to sue ... to prevent or repair
harm to its “quasi-sovereign” interests.’”113 “When a state litigates common public rights [under
the doctrine of parens patriae ], the citizens of that state are represented in such litigation by the
state and are bound by the judgment.”114 But in this case, Wells Fargo successfully argued that the
Nation's parens patriae claims belonged to the individual tribal members and that the Nation
lacked standing to raise them. The Court noted:
Under the ECOA, an “aggrieved applicant” may bring a claim for monetary
damages and equitable and declaratory relief. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(a)–(c). An
“applicant” is “any person who applies to a creditor directly for an extension,
renewal, or continuation of credit, or applies to a creditor indirectly by use of an
existing credit plan for an amount exceeding a previously established credit
limit[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(b).115
To summarize, the Court used the language of the ECOA to hold that a tribe cannot sue on its
members’ behalf because only the applicants themselves have the standing to bring a claim.
B. The Fair Housing Act (FHA)
While this article is focused on the role of the ECOA, it is worth mentioning that mortgage
borrowers are protected by many different federal statutes, laws, and executive orders that all
govern different aspects of a mortgage transaction, including the Fair Housing Act (FHA).116 The
FHA is both narrower and broader than the ECOA. The FHA is narrower than the ECOA in the
sense that the ECOA governs all types of credit transactions (auto loans, credit cards, student loans,
payday loans, etc.), while the FHA covers only residential (mortgage) lending.117 118 The FHA is
broader than the ECOA because it includes all aspects of housing discrimination, even those
unrelated to accessing credit, for example, renting an apartment or seeking housing assistance.119
Additionally, the ECOA and the FHA cover different protected characteristics. The ECOA
protects consumers from discrimination on nine prohibited bases: 1) race, 2) color, 3) religion, 4)
112
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national origin, 5) sex, 6) marital status, 7) age, 8) receipt of public assistance, and 9) exercising
rights under the Consumer Protection Act.120 The FHA covers seven prohibited bases, including:
1) race, 2) color, 3) national origin, 4) religion, 5) sex, 6) familial status, and 7)
disability/handicap.121
The FHA is enforced by HUD and the DOJ.122 DOJ has sued mortgage lenders under both
the ECOA and the FHA when they have imposed more stringent underwriting standards on home
loans or made loans on less favorable terms for borrowers based on their race/ethnicity, including
for discrimination against Native Americans.123
One of the most recent actions taken to protect Native Americans and borrowers on tribal
lands under the FHA was a 2018 conciliation agreement between HUD (on behalf of two
complainant borrowers), a mortgage lender, and an appraiser.124 Two complainants attempted to
refinance their homes located on tribal lands and alleged discrimination on the part of the lender
and the appraisal company after the denied to complete the transaction. Specifically, the
conciliation described the situation as follows:
The Complainants owned their homes on American Indian Reservations in fee
simple. They applied to refinance their primary residences with fixed-rate mortgage
loans from Respondent loanDepot. Respondent loanDepot processed the loan
applications in the normal course of business until Respondent loanDepot closed
the loan application files because the homes were located on an American Indian
Reservation. . . . Respondents deny having intentionally discriminated against
Complainants, but agree to settle the claims in the underlying actions by entering
into this Conciliation Agreement (hereinafter "Agreement"). Respondent
loanDepot asserts it regularly makes credit available on American Indian
Reservations in the normal course of business, but intends, in part through operation
of this Conciliation Agreement, to expand its lending on American Indian
Reservations by expending significant resources to provide and loan subsidies to
qualified borrowers on American Indian Reservations, as well as robust financial
support to community groups that support American Indian consumers.125
Under the terms of the agreement, loanDepot.com agreed to pay each of the two
complainants $30,000 ($60,000 total) and fund a loan subsidy program with $40,000 to benefit
prospective borrowers on American Indian Reservations. LoanDepot.com also agreed to provide
$240,000 to “support outreach programs that improve housing conditions, teach financial literacy,
and provide homeownership education to American Indians on and around reservations.” In
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addition, loanDepot.com agreed to revise its policies regarding the underwriting of home mortgage
loans on land located within the boundaries of American Indian reservations to ensure that its
policies are consistent with the requirements of the Fair Housing Act.126 Appraisal Management
Services of America, Inc., agreed to “revise its policies regarding appraisals for mortgages on
homes located on American Indian reservations and no longer contract with appraisers who refuse
to conduct appraisals on reservations.”127
As the language of the ECOA and the FHA indicate, and as this matter shows, these
regulations provide strong incentives for lenders to lend to American Indians regardless of where
their homes are located.
As this article will examine more closely below, it is important to understand the
parameters and purpose of the ECOA and the FHA when weighing this defense in the context of
mortgage lending on tribal lands. Would the risks to lenders of making a mortgage loan on tribal
land held in trust be so irresponsibly risky to the financial institution as to justify the potential
negative disparate impact on Native Americans? How much is expected of lenders to attempt to
overcome these obstacles? How much is this issue incumbent on the federal government to address
further to make it easier for private lenders? Should the federal government be stepping in to
provide loans directly?
V. THE ROLE OF MANUFACTURED HOUSING
Native Americans (American Indians and Alaska Native populations, AIAN) living in
tribal areas generally face more economic hardships and housing problems than those living
outside of them.128 A report published by HUD found significant disparities in both the rates and
terms of homeownership for AIAN populations, as compared to non-Hispanic white borrowers.129
AIAN borrowers were also more likely to have higher interest rates and to live in manufactured
housing (“mobile homes”) or recreational vehicles (RVs).130 During the reporting period, between
2006 - 2010, 13% of AIAN households lived in mobile homes and RVs, almost twice the rate of
non-AIAN households.131
Because manufactured housing, mobile homes, and RVs are considered chattel (personal
property, like a car or a TV, rather than “real property” / real estate), interest rates are often
substantially higher.132 Interest rates on chattel loans for people living in these types of housing
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are often 50 and 500 basis points more expensive than real property loans. 133 (In reality,
manufactured housing loan interest rates can and often do eclipse 15%.)134
For example, if current interest rates were around three percent (as they are at the time of
writing), a person borrowing $200,000 to buy a house would end up paying back that $200,000
principal plus $103,555 in interest over a thirty-year loan period, so $303,555 in total.135 In
contrast, the same person, borrowing $200,000 to buy a manufactured home, mobile home, or RV,
could be paying an interest rate closer to 8 percent (500 basis points higher) and would end up
paying $328,310 in interest, therefore $528,310 total by the time the loan was paid in full.136 In
fact, with that disparity in interest rates alone, a person would only be able to spend approximately
$115,000 on a mobile home to end up paying the same total amount as a person spending $200,000
on a conventional site-built house secured by a lien.137
According to the CFPB,
Chattel loans generally have lesser consumer protections than mortgages. About
sixty eight percent of all manufactured-housing purchase loans (chattel as well as
real property loans) reported under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 2012 met
the definition of a “higher-priced mortgage loan” (HPML), a definition developed
to identify a set of loans that might be considered subprime. By comparison, only
three percent of loans for site-built homes were HPMLs. Even within the set of
HPMLs, manufactured-home loans tend to have higher rates.138
Additionally, while manufactured housing builders claim that the lifespan of a mobile or
manufactured home is comparable to that of a site-built home,139 older mobile homes were not
even designed to last through the end of a thirty year mortgage loan.140 And, according to a joint
investigation by The Seattle Times and Center for Public Integrity, this problem seems to persist
in newer manufactured homes as well: “In general, owners have difficulty refinancing or selling
their mobile homes because few lenders offer such loans. One big reason: Homes are overpriced
or depreciate so quickly that they generally are worth less than what the borrower owes, even after
years of monthly payments.”141 Adding insult to injury, “mobile homes may be overpriced from
the start . . . [w]hen [one of the nation’s largest manufactured housing lenders] was required to
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obtain appraisals before finalizing a loan, company officials wrote, the home was determined to
be worth less than the sales price about 30 percent of the time.”142
According to HUD, “Housing affordability continues to be a major problem among AIAN
households; between 2006 and 2010, nearly four out of ten AIAN households spent more than
thirty percent of their income on housing and nearly two out of ten households devoted more than
fifty percent of their income to housing costs.”143 Manufactured housing may be a significant
contributor to this problem.
VI. DISCUSSION
Having understood how mortgage lending works and some of the complexities of tribal
land ownership, it is possible to begin to consider how all of these pieces fit together. If mortgage
lenders might actually be facing a greater risk of losing their investment in a foreclosure situation,
and yet they are required to lend regardless of race, national origin, religion, etc., could there be a
conflict? By refusing to lend on tribal land, even with the risks involved, are lenders violating the
ECOA? How far do lenders need to go to attempt to lend equitably on tribal lands (as they do on
non-tribal lands)?
A. What are the challenges facing lenders, borrowers, and tribal governments?
1. Challenges for Lenders
The main obstacle for mortgage lenders working on tribal land is the land ownership
structure.144 As discussed earlier, the majority of tribal and reservation lands are owned in trust by
the federal government.145 Because mortgages must be secured with collateral, generally by a lien
on the property, this ownership structure protects borrowers on tribal lands but prevents mortgage
lenders from collecting on remaining mortgage debts in the event of foreclosure because the
property cannot be resold by the financial institution.146 According to HUD, “land held in trust for
a tribe cannot be mortgaged, and land held in trust for an individual must receive approval from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) before a lien is placed on the property.”147 According to
HUD,“[w]ithout the ability to mortgage and foreclose on a home or place a lien on individual trust
property, lenders were not willing to make home loans to individual Native Americans.”148
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2. Challenges for Borrowers
a. Lack of lenders offering loans on Tribal Lands
Closely tied to the risk for lenders (their inability to recapture lost mortgage payments in
the event of a foreclosure) is the risk that consumers living on tribal lands will be unable to secure
mortgage financing. This risk is the result of a lack of knowledge and risk aversion on the part of
lenders; offering loans on tribal lands presents greater risks without necessarily creating additional
incentives for financial institutions. Additionally, lending on tribal lands triggers numerous issues
of tribal law that most lenders are unlikely to be familiar with.
Considering the provisions of the ECOA listed above, it is easy to see how these market
factors could result in reduced lending on tribal land and, therefore, to Native Americans more
broadly. Of the 5.2 million American Indians and Alaska Natives, approximately sixty percent live
on or near reservation land,149 meaning that the effect is quite broad. If lenders are unable or
unwilling to make mortgage loans on tribal lands, millions of Native Americans could be denied
the benefits of homeownership.
In order to assess whether this disparity constitutes disparate treatment or disparate impact
discrimination under the ECOA, it would be important to understand more about the credit profiles
of the people seeking mortgage credit. (Refusing to lend to someone because they pose an
unacceptable credit risk is not discriminatory.) A 2015 study using a privately acquired credit
profile dataset attempted to conduct this analysis and found that:
. . . our knowledge about credit on reservations remains highly incomplete. Data on
consumer credit conditions on reservations are particularly scarce . . . we find that
the effect of an area’s location vis-a` -vis a reservation often loses significance, a
result suggesting that it is not the reservation border per se that matters for credit
outcomes. We also show that other block group level socio-economic variables,
such as unemployment and even income and education, are not consistently
statistically significant predictors of credit outcomes within reservations. While
non-conclusive, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that there is
racial discrimination in the consumer credit markets in Indian Country.
(emphasis added)150
There is a major opportunity for the federal agencies responsible for enforcing fair lending
laws, which often have access to large amounts of non-public information, and greater resources
than independent researchers, to look into this matter further to assess whether the limited lending
occurring on tribal lands is a warranted side effect of other socioeconomic problems or a symptom
of more widespread discrimination.
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b. Complexity of working with tribal governments
Later in this article, we will discuss some of the approaches that tribes have implemented
to solve these issues. However, one commonality of these approaches is that they involve more
parties than a conventional mortgage transaction. Rather than simply working with a single
mortgage lender or broker, and perhaps a realtor, a consumer seeking credit on tribal land will
need to be savvy and patient enough to include many other stakeholders, including tribal leadership
and sometimes the federal government. These additional layers mean that consumers living on
tribal land will need to plan further ahead than a traditional home buyer/mortgage borrower, that
they will need to be savvy enough to understand these highly specialized programs, and that they
will lose the privacy of working solely and directly with a lender. These challenges will be
discussed in further detail below in the discussions of each individual solution.
3. Challenges for Tribal Governments
a. Discretion about when to exercise sovereign immunity
Although tribes are formally afforded sovereign immunity over the activities occurring on
tribal lands, tribal governments are often cautious about deciding when to enforce these rights.
Tribal governments may actually have a preference of not asserting their sovereign immunity,
especially in conflicts with businesses or other commercial contexts, because it can make outside
parties wary of contracting with them. Tribal governments must weigh the potential for harm that
could occur as a result of entering into a contract with a non-tribal entity with the harm of not being
able to enter into such a contract at all. Is it better for the tribe and its membership to take a risk
and benefit from outside capital, or to avoid risking the loss of tribal land and sovereignty? This is
a question without a clear answer; an impossible question that every tribal government is forced
to answer as it seeks to increase the prosperity of its members.
b. Lack of available funding
As the figures previously discussed indicate, the need for additional mortgage financing
for American Indians, particularly those living on tribal lands, is immense. While tackling a
number of expensive social challenges associated with poverty, tribal governments must make
difficult decisions about how best to allocate funding. Tribal leaders are often responsible for
administering many different social programs, including education, childcare, elder care,
healthcare, housing, substance abuse, domestic violence prevention, and more. Each dollar
allocated to subsidize the cost of owning a home is a dollar that cannot be spent in other areas,
many of which may be more urgent or acute.
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4. Challenges for Regulators
a. History of interference with tribal sovereignty
Regulators are similarly wary of becoming entangled in issues of tribal sovereignty. Very
few employees of the federal government identify as Native Americans or tribal members and
worry about how their actions could be perceived if they had the ultimate effect of harming the
interests of tribal governments. The federal government, in particular, has a long history of harmful
interference, and civil servants today rightly consider the potential for harm before getting
involved.
If tribes choose to use tribal assets as collateral for loans, they risk losing them if their
membership defaults or find themselves unable to pay their loan. Tribal leaders have continued to
fight the many forces seeking to deprive them of their lands.
b. Lack of staff expertise in tribal law and issues
In part because of the lack of American Indian representation in the federal workforce,151
making up just 1.7% of all federal positions, there is a vacuum of experts on issues affecting tribal
residents and governments. Federal Indian law and tribal law are niche areas of study with very
few non-native practitioners. These practitioners are more often in demand by the tribes
themselves as they engage in contracts and commercial opportunities with non-tribal members.
5. Conflicts of Law
One reason that all parties are wary of addressing these issues head on is the inevitable
conflict of law that exists in issues of tribal land and sovereignty. Tribal governments are intended
to be their own sovereigns but are also subject to the hard-to-predict exercise of sovereignty by the
federal government. Federal courts have not been predictable on these issues. Because tribal
questions must be raised in federal court, as opposed to state court,152 the cost of litigating them is
substantial and requires expert lawyers. The stakes are immense when it comes to the potential for
further loss of tribal lands.
Much like the practice of international law, tribal law is complex, slow, expensive, and
often not settled until a case is denied or decided by the Supreme Court. This process can take
years and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars. The risk of litigation alone is enough is keep many
private operators away from even trying to operate on tribal land.
With all of these obstacles, it quickly becomes understandable why mortgage lending on
tribal land can be so challenging. The next section will provide several case studies for how
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mortgage lending on tribal lands is currently accomplished – some showing more promise than
others.
VII. CURRENT PRACTICES
A. Federal Public-Private Partnerships
For many of the reasons described above, federal solutions are limited and imprecise. By
definition, federal involvement in the process of mortgage lending on tribal lands has been onesize-fits-all. However, the diversity of the 574 federally recognized tribes means that it is rare for
one program to appropriately address the needs of all tribes.
1. Section 184 Indian Home Loan Guarantee Program
Congress established the Section 184 Indian Home Loan Guarantee Program, in 1992, “to
facilitate homeownership and increase access to capital in Native American Communities.”153
This program is jointly administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), part of the United States
Department of the Interior.
HUD’s 184 program is funded through Congressional appropriation and receives between
$1.4M and $2M annually.154 When distributed over the approximately two thousand loans it
guarantees per year, this works out to a per-loan cost of approximately $700.155 Since the
inception of the program in 1992, HUD has obligated funds to guarantee approximately 46,000
loans with a cumulative loan level of $7.7 billion.156
This program uses a legal fiction to circumvent the complexities of foreclosure on tribal
land. For a typical mortgage, the person taking out the mortgage owns the land in fee simple, the
highest possible ownership interest, meaning that no one else can claim primary title to the land.
If the borrower fails to pay their mortgage and enters foreclosure, the bank / financer can sell the
property to pay off the rest of the mortgage. For a home on tribal land, however, the person living
in the home is unlikely to own the land; nearly 80% of tribal lands are held in trust by the federal
government, for the benefit of the tribal members. Therefore, if a person living on tribal land were
to default on their mortgage, the lender would not be able to sell the property because they do not
hold title to the land; the lender would stand to lose any outstanding mortgage balance.
Under the Section 184 program, however, the borrower leases the land property from the
tribe on a lease approved by BIA and HUD to create a leasehold estate. 157 The mortgage lien is
153
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placed on the physical structure of the home and the leasehold estate so that only those can be
foreclosed, but the land will remain in trust for the tribe regardless of foreclosure.158
For a home loan on individual or "allotted" trust land, both HUD and the BIA must
approve the loan applicant. In the event of a default by a borrower on a 184
guaranteed loan on either tribal or individual trust land, the lender or HUD can only
pursue liquidation of the loan after offering to transfer the loan to an eligible tribal
member, the tribe or the Indian Housing Authority serving the tribe. In the event of
a foreclosure, the lender or HUD can not [SIC] sell the property to anyone but an
eligible tribal member, the tribe or the housing authority serving the tribe. Thus the
unique status of the trust land is protected.159
More than 185 tribes and Alaskan villages have been approved for HUD's Section 184 loan
guarantee program.160
While this program offers a tidy solution to the land ownership issue, it creates tremendous
complexity for borrowers. Before even submitting a mortgage application to BIA for review, a
borrower must comply with seven separate steps involving a back-and-forth exchange between the
federal government and their mortgage lender.161 The government manual for implementing this
process outlines several dozen further steps over many pages that must all work successfully in
order for the mortgage to go through.162 Anyone with experience working with the federal
government will be able to understand that each step presents an opportunity for failure and the
likelihood of so many steps with so many stakeholders working smoothly on the first try is likely
to be small.
Furthermore, the program is restricted to certain states and has an extremely limited list of
participating lenders.163 While consumers off of tribal lands have access to literally thousands of
lenders,164 consumers seeking to use the Section 184 program to buy a house on tribal land have
to choose from fewer than 125 lenders, many of which lend only in one state.165 While, in theory,
this program should allow borrowers on tribal land to access the mortgage products that other
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borrowers have access to, the barriers to doing so are enormous. Tribal consumers have fewer
choices in who they can borrow from and many additional hurdles in order to succeed.
That said, improvements continue to be made to this program. For example, the
Department of Interior's Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Department of Agriculture's Rural
Development, and HUD's Office of Native American Programs have been working together to
shorten the timeframe for the title search reports (TSRs) required to process a Section 184 loan.166
While this may seem like a small technical fix, backlogs at Bureau of Indian Affairs offices could
add up to twelve months to the home buying process as a result of the TSR process, so improving
this particular pain point could make homeownership attainable up to a year sooner.167 In several
models, tribes have contracted with BIA to assume part of the title search and recordation
process.168 The Saginaw-Chippewa Tribe, in Michigan, reports that setting up its own tribal
leasehold recording office has contributed to its ability to sell $60 million in loans to Fannie
Mae.169 The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes in Montana, which have also assumed title
search and recordation functions from the BIA, receive 10 to 15 title search requests per day and
having control over this function has helped them originate 70 Section 184 loans over a two-year
period.170
The Section 184 Program has greatly expanded the supply of mortgage credit to Native
borrowers.171 Loans under this program have grown from less than 600 per year before 2005, to
over 4,000 loans in 2015, and an aggregate total of more than 6,000 as of 2017.172 However, most
of this growth has bypassed tribal lands held in trust, the areas arguably most in need of such
financing, resulting in 93% of HUD 184 loans being made on fee land in recent years.173 According
to the Federal Reserve, “developing trust lands for homeownership remains a serious challenge
and involves a lengthy and often burdensome process that reduces the appeal of lending on tribal
trust land, even with the federal guarantee.”174
2. Other Federal Programs
The majority of the large-scale efforts to increase mortgage capital on tribal lands, have been
the result of efforts by the federal government, through a variety of programs hosted by a number of
different agencies. These programs are well-funded but lack the efficiency of the solutions offered
by tribal governments.
Between 1995 and 2005, the HUD section 184 loan guarantee program (discussed above)
made 2,796 loans to individuals and tribal housing authorities for more than $296 million.175 Of the
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total, 914 (33%) were loans on tribal trust land.176 In 1996, the Native American Housing and
Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA) consolidated a number of Indian housing programs into an
Indian housing block grant (IHBG).177 This grant provides a range of affordable housing activities
on Indian reservations and Indian areas with funding of approximately $600 million a year.178
The Department of Agriculture provides section 502 loans, which can be used to help
low-income households purchase homes. Between 1999 and 2005, 2,935 section 502 direct and
guaranteed loans were provided on trust and allotted lands between, totaling $233.1 million. 179 The
Veterans Administration, through the pilot Native American Veterans Direct Home Loan Program,
has made 480 direct loans since 1993, all on trust land.180
Between 1995 and 20015, Fannie Mae, through the Native American Conventional Lending
Initiative (NACLI), purchased loans covering 11,804 single-family homes on tribal lands (including
properties on tribal trust, allotted land, and fee simple lands) totaling nearly $1.1 billion.181 (These
totals include HUD 184, FHA 248, USDA 502, and conventional loans.)
B. Tribal Solutions and Native CDFIs
While federal solutions are generally well-funded but often too blunt to accommodate all
tribal communities and borrowers, community development financial institutions (CDFIs) often
find themselves in the opposite situation. CDFIs are non-profit entities that seek to aid in the
development of local communities, and there are dozens of native CDFIs that are currently or have
the potential to serve as emissaries of mortgage lending on tribal land.182
1. The Menominee
The Menominee are a relatively small tribe of 8,720 members, located in Wisconsin.183
The Menominee Reservation is located on 235,524 acres, approximately 357.96 square miles, and
contains roughly 223,500 acres of heavily forested lands.184 Approximately 98% of the land is held
in trust and 2% is held in fee simple.185
Four separate loan programs are administered by the Menominee tribal government: (1)
The Menominee Loan Fund, which provides a means for eligible applicants to obtain financing
for personal items and purposes; (2) The Revolving Loan Fund, which provides a means for
eligible applicants to obtain financing for business purposes; (3) The HUD/CDBG Home
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Improvement Loan, which provides a means for eligible applicants to obtain financing for repairs
and renovations to the home they own; and (4) The Housing Down payment Loan Fund, which
provides a means for eligible applicants to obtain financing for the down payment required with
the purchase of a single family residence.186
Furthermore, Menominee tribal members have access to the Wisconsin Native Loan Fund
(WINLF). WINLF is a “non-profit 501(c)(3) United States Treasury Department Certified
community development financial institution (CDFI), created to provide tribal members with
alternative financing and financial services on Wisconsin Indian Reservations.”187 “WINLF has
the mission . . . to elevate tribal members towards building capacity for individuals and families to
help them become economically stronger . . . to retain money in the community and teach people
to become more self- reliant and economically independent.”188 WINLF provides access to home
improvement loans, down payment assistance, home purchase loans, debt consolidation, and micro
business loans.189
WINLF has closed 396 loans on nine reservations and deployed $2,407,849 in loan capital
to tribal members in Wisconsin.190 Compare this to the HUD 184 program’s per-loan cost: while
HUD only needs to secure the loans with an origination fee (less than one thousand dollars per
loan), this CDFI is expending more than six thousand dollars per loan. The CDFI model is more
direct, but also more expensive.
The Menominee tribe offers a strong example of a CDFI / direct lending model that tribes with
the resources could consider deploying. This model provides an advantage to consumers living on
tribal lands because it allows them to work with a single entity to secure mortgage financing despite
living on land that does not provide sufficient collateral for a conventional mortgage lender.
While the direct lender / CDFI model may be the best option from the perspective of
borrowers living on tribal land, it requires a tribe to have the resources of cash on hand or access
to financing, as well as the financial knowledge and sophistication to run such an organization. It
forces tribes with limited resources to choose between members for transactions that have
tremendous implications for their long-term financial wellbeing.
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2.

The Navajo Nation

The Navajo Nation faces the same challenges to mortgage lending and home ownership
outlined previously in this article, principally, the inability to obtain a mortgage because a lien
cannot be placed on the land.191
[M]any Navajo live in inadequate homes that lack basic amenities such as
plumbing. Navajo homeowners often occupy very basic mobile homes that they
find less than adequate. They cite creaky, unstable floor panels and thin walls,
which provide poor insulation and wind resistance, among other problems . . .
Navajo in all income groups have to wait many years to find affordable housing
because housing of all types is limited . . . Unable to qualify for
government-subsidized housing and denied mortgages on the reservation, many
have been forced to leave the reservation or to opt for temporary housing . . .
Although powerful motivations exist for developing a mortgage financed
homeownership market on the Navajo Nation, no conventional home mortgages
had been granted on the reservation through 1994. Even through mid-1998, fewer
than fifteen mortgages had been completed. The numbers clearly imply that
mortgage lending on the Navajo reservation faces potent obstacles.192
In response, the tribe passed the Navajo Master Area Land Lease Act, which designated specific
tracts of land on the Navajo reservation as Master Land Lease (MLL) areas, each with a separate
entity having oversight of the leasing activities for that area.193 Solving the lien issue, MLL area
land could be used as collateral for either commercial or housing development, and it reserved the
right of first refusal in the case of foreclosure to the Navajo tribal government.194
The Navajo Deed of Trust Act, the precursor to the section 200c lease, was created by the
Navajo in collaboration with Fannie Mae and the BIA.195 “With a section 200c lease, Navajo tribal
members [could] get exclusive rights to a one-acre property for a sixty-five-year period.”196 The
section 200c leasehold serves as sufficient collateral for a mortgage because it allows the bank to
foreclose on both the home and the lease.197 The newer section 200c lease was approved by the
Navajo Nation and Fannie Mae for use with mortgage loans.198
While the above changes, especially the section 200c homesite lease, have been
heralded as a breakthrough in the legal logjam that has kept banks from granting
mortgages on the Navajo Nation, problems do remain. For both individual and
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tribal trust lands, obtaining a homesite lease requires considerable effort in
acquiring approval from tribal authorities (and relevant individuals in the case of
individual trust land). Additionally, using the section 200c lease as security for a
mortgage loan requires Navajo Nation and BIA approval, and obtaining approval
can be a tedious process . . .
The second major legal obstacle to lending on Indian reservations relates to tribal
sovereignty. If foreclosure and eviction become necessary, the process is subject
not to federal or state law, but rather to the laws of the sovereign tribes and to the
jurisdiction of tribal courts. Many banks perceive tribal foreclosure and eviction
laws as insufficient protection for their capital. Furthermore, even if laws are in
place, lenders might be reluctant to press their claims in tribal courts because they
are unfamiliar with this venue.199
More recently, the Navajo Partnership for Housing (NPH) was incorporated, on April 19,
1996, in Window Rock, Arizona, the seat of Navajo tribal government.200 NPH is a nonprofit housing
partnership operating to create homeownership opportunities on the Navajo Nation by improving
access to private mortgage capital.201 The Partnership focuses on fostering homeownership for
middle-income Navajo.202 To improve access to capital, build Native capacity for homeownership,
and remove legal barriers, the NPH began working with other non-tribal community groups.203
In Arizona, for example, the Navajo Partnership for Housing (NPH) helped pilot
the Presidential Initiative One-Stop Mortgage Center, a joint project of the U.S.
Treasury Department and the [United States] Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Since its inception, NPH, with financial support from their partner
the Navajo Housing Authority, has helped more than 209 Navajo families purchase
or rehabilitate homes by packaging or originating 323 loans and grants totaling
approximately $17.9 million, primarily on Tribal Trust Land.
In Oklahoma, Little Dixie Community Action Agency provides technical assistance
to nonprofits and tribal housing authorities through a Rural Development Self-Help
technical assistance contract with the [United States] Agriculture Department.
Little Dixie is currently working with the Oglala Sioux Tribe Partnership for
Housing, the Creek Nation, and the Cherokee Nation to promote mortgage-based
homeownership through the Self-Help Model. 204
More broadly, tribes, federal agencies, GSEs, financial institutions, Indian housing authorities and
nonprofit organizations have all made concerted efforts to promote access to mortgage credit on
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tribal lands.205 These efforts have resulted in the cooperative development of several special loan
products to meet the needs of homebuyers on tribal lands.
C. Other Options
1. Manufactured Housing
Manufactured housing is a commonly used alternative option for borrowers on tribal land.
Manufactured housing avoids the land ownership issues discussed above because the loan is
secured by the housing structure itself (rather than the land). 206 These loans fall into the category
of “chattel loans,” alongside auto loans and loans for other personal property, such as furniture or
electronics.207 Because the value of most personal property (as compared to real property)
decreases over time, interest rates for chattel loans are generally higher than those for real estate.
Additionally, because many borrowers seeking credit to cover the cost of a manufactured home
have lower incomes, many of these loans are offered at sub-prime rates, often eclipsing mortgage
rates by a factor of four.208
[Manufactured homes are a] widely used form of affordable housing in Indian
Country - about 17 [%] of reservation households currently reside in a
manufactured home, on par with the rate in rural America generally, and close to
half of the American Indians who borrowed to buy a home on reservation land in
2016 secured their loan with a manufactured home.209
These homes provide a significant cost savings over traditional site-built homes – “[e]xcluding
land, a 1,700 square-foot structure, for example, could be built for about $86,000 in a factory
(assuming two-section construction) as opposed to about $171,000 on-site.”210
However, cost is not the only consideration in buying a home. Many consumers have found
that these homes do not last as long as the terms on their loans, and all consumers will find that
manufactured homes do not appreciate at the same rate as traditional site-built homes.211 Despite
these significant downsides, buying a manufactured home may still be one of the best options
available to people living on tribal land because they require fewer steps (and less time) to acquire,
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involve fewer stakeholders, and give the consumer a sense of agency that they may lack in more
complicated transactions that require the aid of their tribal government, several agencies of the
federal government, and a lender selected from a limited list.
VIII. A WAY FORWARD
As these examples have shown, the current options available to lenders and consumers living
on tribal lands are limited. Federal programs often have good funding but offer solutions that are too
blunt and complex for the diversity of consumers on tribal lands. Native CDFIs and other locally
administered programs may be more precisely targeted, but often lack funding.
While HUD receives ample funding for its 184 program each year and is able to help
thousands of borrowers per year achieve homeownership, it is still limited in its reach to native
consumers located on tribal land. It offers reduced consumer choices in terms of the number of
lenders and requires new homeowners to work back and forth with their lender and the federal
government, often for more than a year. When compared to the month that the same process takes
for a home purchased off of tribal land, this delay creates considerable obstacles and costs to
homeownership on tribal lands.
Native-owned CDFIs and other community-run programs are much more targeted and
precise; able to address the pain points specific to each community and to operate with greater speed
and efficiency. However, they often lack the funding to have the type of broad impact that federal
programs can achieve.
Manufactured housing offers an entirely private, free-market alternative that allows
consumers living on tribal land to obtain rapid access to inexpensive housing, though often with
outsize financing costs and questionable long-term outcomes. While manufactured housing does not
require a mortgage to be secured by land and is therefore more accessible to consumers living on
tribal lands held in trust, the interest rates for chattel loans often soar to many times that of a
conventional mortgage. Furthermore, while the manufactured housing industry continues to improve
upon the quality of manufactured homes, consumers can still find themselves paying down a
mortgage for a manufactured home that has aged more rapidly than was promised. On a per square
foot basis, a manufactured home may also not be any less expensive than a site-built home with a
mortgage secured by the land and dwelling.
The variety of currently available options means the native consumers and consumers living
on tribal land are able, at least in theory, to secure some type of home ownership. In practice,
however, these options remain far more limited, and expensive, than those for consumers living
outside of tribal lands.
As identified earlier, demand for homeownership on tribal lands and among native
consumers is no lower than for any other consumer group. Consumers living on tribal lands are no
less capable or deserving of the opportunity for owning their own homes and building
intergenerational wealth. It would be hard to argue that the money does not exist to fund this
opportunity, but it is clear that finding the correct channels to route this funding has been a challenge.
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Further solutions will require both ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks;’ the federal government could offer
incentives to private lenders and CDFIs to operate more robustly on tribal land but may also need to
punish those who fail to offer equitable access to credit. While HUD’s 184 program has shown some
success, the large and clunky federal scale operations create delay and undoubtedly cause increased
expense. Native CDFIs circumvent these issues, but often lack the funding given to federal agencies.
One avenue for further investigation might be to route federal funding for tribal lending programs
through Native owned CDFIs, which understand the needs of native consumers and consumers living
on tribal lands in a way that the federal government never will.
There are many ways to move money allocated in the federal budget, most of which require
willpower and political capital to get budget items through Congressional appropriations. One way
to do this would be to offer low interest loans, earmarked for mortgages, administered by CDFIs.
These loans could be used in a variety of ways, covering everything from down payment assistance
to establishing some way to secure the mortgage. Native CDFIs in particular are in a strong position
to understand what their neighbors need in order to obtain mortgage financing.
The federal government could also expand access to mortgage credit on tribal land by more
vigorously enforcing the protections offered by the ECOA and the FHA. Current federal
enforcement in this area, as discussed above, is extremely limited. With greater understanding of the
obstacles of fair lending on tribal lands, federal agencies have the opportunity to provide clearer
guidance for both lenders and borrowers about how to obtain mortgage financing for properties
located on tribal lands. Once lenders have clear guidance and time to gain broader experience in this
market, federal regulators could use the enforcement “stick” to ensure that consumers living on tribal
land are not being subjected to widespread credit discrimination. If, after a discretionary period,
lenders are still avoiding lending to consumers living on tribal land, the appropriate agencies could
open investigations. As these options illustrate, the federal government has a broad toolkit of
incentives that it can use to increase access to mortgage credit on tribal lands.
IX. CONCLUSION
Lending on tribal lands presents challenges for borrowers, tribes, and government
regulators. The complexity of mortgage banking on tribal lands makes compliance with fair
lending laws particularly challenging to follow, and laws at the state and federal levels often
conflict in this area.
State and federal governments generally have insufficient personnel and funding with
devoted to tribal lending, which prevents them from better regulating these issues. Additionally, a
long history of government interference with tribal sovereignty further complicates these issues
and makes fair lending enforcement a fraught area.
Numerous options, both public and private, have attempted to address these obstacles.
Federal programs have provided solid funding and given private lenders the confidence to make
loans to native borrowers but have fallen short of meeting the demand for loans on tribal land.
Native CDFIs and other tribally governed programs have been able to satisfy more targeted needs
but have often lacked sufficient funding to reach the majority of consumers seeking to become
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homeowners. By bridging the gap between these two solutions, both groups can empower native
consumers and consumers living on tribal lands to become homeowners and build the
intergenerational wealth associated with homeownership.
By encouraging proven lenders, particularly native CDFIs, with subsidized lending
programs backed by the federal government, combined with vigorous enforcement of federal fair
lending laws, the federal government can continue to improve rates of homeownership and
economic prosperity on tribal land and beyond.
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